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Abstract 
 In July 2001, Lieutenant General Donald L. Peterson, Deputy Chief of Staff, 
Personnel, United States Air Force, testified before Congress that adverse retention rates 
were senior leadership’s number one concern.  Military compensation sustains “defense 
manpower policies that in turn support the nation’s defense strategy.”  Defense spending 
must be allocated efficiently to maintain the optimal mix of forces and weapon systems to 
respond to national security objectives. The President requested $149.9 billion for 
military pay and healthcare for Fiscal Year 2009, or 29 percent of the total proposed 
defense budget.  When military compensation constitutes nearly one-third of department 
expenses, its impact on retention of personnel must meet targets. 
 This thesis estimates the value of military compensation’s effect on the probability 
of retaining Air Force personnel in a cross-sectional analysis.  The findings suggest that 
compensation packages are effective at retaining military members at critical points in 
their career to develop senior officer and enlisted leaders.  Prior research estimated at the 
aggregate level, but we modeled our data for individual observations to estimate how 
members prefer to delay civilian earnings until after retirement eligibility.  We found that 
our findings, while interesting, would improve if estimated through a binary probit model 
in time-series analysis. 
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AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS  
OF COMPENSATION TO RETENTION 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
 
Purpose 
 
 This thesis estimates the value of military compensation’s effect on the probability 
of retaining Air Force personnel in a cross-sectional analysis.  The findings suggest that 
compensation packages are effective at retaining military members at critical points in 
their career to develop senior officer and enlisted leaders.  Prior research estimated at the 
aggregate level, but we modeled our data for individual observations to estimate how 
members prefer to delay civilian earnings until after retirement eligibility.  We found that 
our findings, while interesting, would improve if estimated through a binary probit model 
in time-series analysis. 
Background 
 
 In July 2001, Lieutenant General Donald L. Peterson, Deputy Chief of Staff, 
Personnel, United States Air Force, testified before Congress that adverse retention rates 
were senior leadership’s number one concern.  He went on to say, “We need to attract 
America’s best and brightest, and we must retain them.  While patriotism is the number 
one reason our people – both officers and enlisted – stay in the Air Force, patriotism 
alone cannot be the sole motivation for a military career” (Peterson, 2001:4).  “While 
intangible factors like patriotism are important draws for many who volunteer to serve, 
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the military relies heavily on good pay and benefits—the tangible rewards for service—to 
maintain its competitive edge as an employer in U.S. labor markets” (Williams, 2005:11). 
 Defense spending must be allocated efficiently to maintain the optimal mix of 
forces and weapon systems to respond to national security objectives.  Compensation to 
military members of the US armed services is the third largest element of the Department 
of Defense (DoD) budget, behind Strategic Modernization and Operations, Readiness and 
Support.  The President requested $149.9 billion for military pay and healthcare in Fiscal 
Year (FY) 2009, or 29 percent of the total proposed budget (DoD, 2008a:6).  Historically 
comparing, the President requested 25 percent more for military compensation than in the 
previous fiscal year (DoD, 2008a:8).  
 The nation’s military remains engaged in combat, costly both in lives and federal 
spending, since the 9/11 attacks.  From 2001 through the end of FY 2007, Congress spent 
$602 billion in military operations and related activities in the Global War on Terror 
(Orszag, 2007:3).  As of 18 December 2008, 4,824 military members lost their lives in 
the wars fought in Iraq and Afghanistan (OSD, 2008).  As the complexity of the war 
grows, military members are challenged with responsibilities in hostile environments that 
may shape their decision criteria for separating from the service (Burrell, 2007:24).   
Competitive wages from the private industry may have adverse effects on retention rates 
of high-quality military members when similar or higher salaries are available without the 
dangers and instability of war.  Military compensation supports “defense manpower 
policies that in turn support the nation’s defense strategy” (DoD, 2008b:33).  When 
military compensation constitutes nearly a third of the entire defense budget, its influence 
on retention of uniformed personnel must meet targets. 
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Research Question 
How does the marginal effect of cash and non-cash military compensation 
influence the decision of US Air Force personnel to continue active duty service to 
retirement eligibility? 
Scope 
The Sixth Edition of the Military Compensation Background Papers published by 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) identified six principles to guide the 
discussion on the military personnel compensation system.  OSD defined these 
principles: (1) Manpower/Compensation Interrelationship, (2) Compatibility with 
Technology and Tactics, (3) Equity, (4) Effectiveness in Peace and War, (5) Flexibility, 
and (6) Motivational Aspects (OSD, 2005:4).   
 The first principle recognizes the role of compensation in maintaining the optimal 
mix of forces in the armed services given their objectives.  Compensation must be 
adequate enough to support manpower policies designed to sustain the military strategies 
in defense of this nation.   
 Secondly, compensation must maintain the personnel base, both in rank and skill-
set, to meet the manning needs of these weapon systems in the future (OSD, 2005:5).  If 
compensation fails to recruit and retain high quality personnel, the personnel budget will 
ineffectively crowd-out recapitalization and modernization of weapon systems. 
 Next, the two basic tenets of equity deal largely with the concept of fairness.  
Military members, just as any member of the labor force, desire to be compensated fairly; 
compensation should be comparable and competitive. 
 Additionally, military compensation must demonstrate effectiveness in the 
 4 
 
recruiting and retention of high-quality military personnel in times of war just as in times 
of peace.  DoD only has one compensation system regardless if the armed services are 
engaged in a military contingency or not, however severe the conflict may be.  The 
department, however, does make minor adjustments to the compensation system to offer 
monetary benefits when a service member is deployed in support of a military 
contingency. 
 Furthermore, military compensation must be flexible to accommodate changes in 
military objectives and the dynamics of the private sector.  Military compensation must 
be flexible to respond to manpower policies and changes in civilian wages for various 
sectors. 
 Lastly, the compensation system must recognize the relationship with pay and 
effort.  The military force structure promotes officers and enlisted members to encourage 
performance and desire for more responsibility (OSD, 2005:9). 
Approach/Methodology 
We engaged our research question with a review of previous literature, data 
collection, and regression analysis to estimate the relationship between military 
compensation and the retention of uniformed personnel in the US Air Force.  We 
collected data to develop a binomial response variable to quantitatively describe the 
continuation decision of military members.  In our research, we reviewed a series of 
inputs that we believe have a relationship with the decision military members make 
regarding retention and collected data to represent these variables.  Additionally, we 
controlled for differences in groups through the use of dummy variables for gender, rank, 
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Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC), commissioning source for officers, and citizenship 
status for enlisted members. 
We modeled our data at three points available in our sampling frame: the stay-or-
go decision from 2001 to 2002, 2004 to 2005, and 2007 to 2008.  We estimated officers 
and enlisted personnel separately through a probit model for binary response.  Each 
model estimated the significant contributing factors in an individual’s decision to remain 
in the service from year n to year n + 1.   
Significance 
Researchers often conduct regression analysis using continuous values to describe 
the dependent variable.  Observing the dependent variable on this scale allows it to take 
on predicted values without restriction.  The predicted value of the dependent variable 
may be expressed as an integer, as a decimal point, and even a negative number when 
regressed on the explanatory variables.  While useful in other conditions, conventional 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) analysis does not reveal the interesting relationship we are 
concerned with in this thesis because its use constitutes a misspecification. 
 We modeled the relationship of variables that influence the decision to either 
remain in active duty service (stay) or pursue employment elsewhere (go).  We define 
this decision as the dependent variable “Continue.”  The explained variable does not take 
on continuous values; it is either “Stay” or “Go,” or binary in nature.  Therefore, we 
model our independent variables to observe what factors are statistically significant in the 
individual decision analysis to continue on active duty service in the Air Force from year 
n to year n + 1. 
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 Previous research modeled this relationship at the aggregate level.  Burrell (2007) 
used continuation rates to proxy for retention.  Continuation rates represent the 
percentage of Air personnel that continue in active duty service from one year to the next.  
Burrell’s methodology observed how Air Force-level retention changes when factors 
such as military retirement, unemployment rates, and annual pay raises change.  We 
model our data at the individual level.  Researchers may use binary variables to describe 
a qualitative event; such as dummy variables in the explanatory variables to allow for an 
intercept change and/or a slope change amongst various groups.  Instead, we use a binary 
variable to describe a qualitative event: will an individual stay in the Air Force (y = 1) or 
go (y = 0) with a given value of xn? 
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II. Literature Review 
 
Overview 
 
 In July 2001, Lieutenant General Donald L. Peterson, Deputy Chief of Staff, 
Personnel, United States Air Force, testified before Congress that adverse retention rates 
were senior leadership’s number one concern.  He went on to say, “We need to attract 
America’s best and brightest, and we must retain them.  While patriotism is the number 
one reason our people – both officers and enlisted – stay in the Air Force, patriotism 
alone cannot be the sole motivation for a military career” (Peterson, 2001:4).  “While 
intangible factors like patriotism are important draws for many who volunteer to serve, 
the military relies heavily on good pay and benefits—the tangible rewards for service—to 
maintain its competitive edge as an employer in U.S. labor markets” (Williams, 2005:11). 
Military Compensation Context 
 The Sixth Edition of the Military Compensation Background Papers published by 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) identified six principles to guide the 
discussion on the military personnel compensation system.  OSD defined these 
principles: (1) Manpower/Compensation Interrelationship, (2) Compatibility with 
Technology and Tactics, (3) Equity, (4) Effectiveness in Peace and War, (5) Flexibility, 
and (6) Motivational Aspects (OSD, 2005:4). 
Manpower/Compensation Interrelationship 
 The first principle recognizes the role of compensation in maintaining the optimal 
mix of forces in the armed services given their objectives.  Compensation must be 
adequate enough to support manpower policies designed to sustain the military strategies 
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in defense of this nation.  Force shaping problems, an imbalance of officers and enlisted 
personnel or among specialties and skills, will likely ensue when compensation does not 
adequately meet service member expectations.  Lieutenant General Roger A. Brady, 
former deputy chief of staff for manpower and personnel, stated, “If we get too far out of 
balance, we cannot operate as effectively.  We cannot recapitalize, we cannot replace the 
old equipment that we have. And the Airmen who remain with us do not get the training 
they need or the equipment they need, and we have hard time sustaining operations” 
(Gettle, 2006a).  Those results will frustrate national security strategy and, in turn, negate 
defense policy objectives (OSD, 2005:4). 
Compatibility with Technology and Tactics 
 The emergence of costly technologies on the battlefield to support military tactics 
heightens the level of scrutiny on military compensation.  Firstly, compensation places a 
tremendous fiscal burden on the Defense budget; the costs must not encumber on the 
procurement for new weapon system requirements.  In recent years, the Air Force’s 
efforts to recapitalize and modernize aging weapon systems led to a reshaping of force 
structure.  The Air Force targeted 20,000 reductions in military personnel between fiscal 
years 2005 and 2007; this included 8,000 personnel cuts in the officer corps in 2007 alone 
(Gettle, 2006a,b).  The military reductions coincided with the most fleet modernization 
funding requested in 15 years as the Air Force made large investments in C-17 
Globemasters, F-22A Raptors, and unmanned aerial vehicles (Munoz, 2006).  
Compensation must maintain the personnel base, both in rank and skill-set, to meet the 
manning needs of these weapon systems in the future (OSD, 2005:5).  If compensation 
fails to recruit and retain high quality personnel, the personnel budget will ineffectively 
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crowd-out recapitalization and modernization of weapon systems. 
Equity 
 The two basic tenets of equity deal largely with the concept of fairness.  Military 
members, just as any member of the labor force, desire to be compensated fairly; 
compensation should be comparable and competitive.  Comparable refers to uniformed 
personnel being paid what one would expect in the private sector.  DoD programs 
compensation based on civilian positions with similar responsibilities and possessing 
similar experience and education levels.  The concept of competitiveness relates how 
well military compensation compares to private sector salaries.   In order to compete for 
high-quality uniformed personnel, members must prefer military compensation to private 
industry compensation (OSD, 2005:5).  The degree to which military members prefer 
military compensation measures how well competitive pay and benefits met the military 
members’ expectations.  We expect military members to value the comparability and 
competiveness of military compensation differently based on the years of service because 
the value of deferred benefits become more valuable as a military member gets closer to 
retirement eligibility. 
Effectiveness in Peace and War 
 Military compensation must demonstrate effectiveness in the recruiting and 
retention of high-quality military personnel in times of war just as in times of peace.  
DoD only has one compensation system regardless if the armed services are engaged in a 
military contingency or not, however severe the conflict may be.  The department, 
however, does make minor adjustments to the compensation system to offer monetary 
benefits when a service member is deployed in support of a military contingency.  The 
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benefits include, but are not limited to, exclusion from federal income tax, family 
separation allowance, and hardship duty pay for the months that a member serves in a 
deployed location.  OSD designs the compensation system to allow normal flow of 
personnel to complement barriers to entry and exit of the service, in the recruiting of 
high-quality personnel and separation or retirement of military members, respectively.  
The effectiveness of the compensation system in sustaining the best mix of forces allows 
mission success during peacetime training and wartime execution (OSD, 2005:7). 
Flexibility 
 Despite the use of only one compensation system, military compensation must be 
flexible to accommodate changes in military objectives and the dynamics of the private 
sector.  Compensation must be economically efficient, as General Peterson said, in 
keeping “…the right number of people.  Not too few.  Not too many” (Gettle, 2006a).  He 
added, “I think there are a lot of things we find, when you have a large organization like 
the Air Force, that are inefficiencies we can cut out.  We are going to be more efficient 
than we have been forced to in the past.”  Changes in the national economy and the 
supply and demand of high-quality personnel motivate rapid adjustments in 
compensation (OSD, 2005:8).  For example, wage increases in private industry have 
changed across time; however, compensation within and across white- and blue-collar 
industries has not followed the same pattern (Schwenk, 1997:14).  Differences in skill, 
education, and ability help explain how the range of salaries has grown since the early 
1980’s (Asch, 2002:2).  To accommodate such dynamics, the Air Force offers special 
pays to retain specialty skills.  For that reason, competitive bonuses are offered for 
professionals in the aviation, legal, and medical fields to retain against changes in civilian 
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wages for the same sectors. 
Motivational Aspects  
 Lastly, the compensation system must recognize the relationship with pay and 
effort.  The military force structure promotes officers and enlisted members to encourage 
performance and desire for more responsibility (OSD, 2005:9).  “A promotion is not a 
reward for past service; it is an advancement to a higher grade based on future potential 
as demonstrated by past performance” (AFI 36-201, 2007:62).  Duty positions are 
designed to commensurate with the level of responsibility for the appropriate rank.  The 
Air Force awards promotions based on relative rather than absolute performance.  Greater 
potential may be associated aptly with smarter or more capable personnel since these 
individuals are more likely to achieve a higher rank-order.  However, less able military 
personnel can overcome the disadvantage by exerting more effort.  Therefore, the 
compensation system should motivate personnel to perform at or even beyond their 
potential as measured by intelligence (Asch, 1994:54).  
Assessment of Military Compensation 
 Active duty military personnel earn compensation commensurate with rank, years 
of service, and dependency status.  10 U.S.C. §101(d)(1) defines active duty personnel as 
those members on full-time duty in the active service to include full-time training, annual 
training duty, and attendance, while in the active military service, at a school designated 
as a service school by law, or the Service concerned.  DoD does not consider full-time 
National Guard duty as active-duty despite the similarities.  The department, since the 
Gorham Commission in 1962, assesses active-duty personnel pay relative to private 
industry wages through the use of Regular Military Compensation (RMC) (OSD, 
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2005:14).  Four elements comprise RMC that military members receive either directly or 
indirectly, in cash or in kind: basic pay, basic allowance for housing, basic allowance for 
subsistence, and tax advantage.   
 Grade and years-of-service determine the first component, basic pay.  Most often, 
rank and grade are parallel.  For example, a Captain earns O-3 pay and a Master Sergeant 
earns E-7 pay.  When a member fills a duty position that requires an individual with a 
higher rank, the member can be frocked.  In that event, the member wears a higher rank, 
but continues to be paid according to their current grade.  The Defense Finance and 
Accounting Service (DFAS) publishes basic pay rates annually; the rates include pay 
raises as years-of-service and grade increase.  Secondly, military members earn Basic 
Allowance for Housing (BAH), a non-taxable housing allowance based on rank and 
dependency status and adjusted for duty location, to defer housing costs at the members’ 
duty location.   The Per Diem, Travel, and Transportation established BAH rates to 
prevent military members from incurring out-of-pocket expenses beyond the entitlement 
for a rental property.  The expected square footage for a member at a particular grade and 
dependency status determines the dollar value of the entitlement.  Next, Basic Allowance 
for Subsistence (BAS), a non-taxable allowance as well, serves to defray the cost of food 
for military members; the amount is based on whether the member is an officer or an 
enlisted Airman.  BAS, unlike the other entitlements, pays a lower rate to officers than to 
enlisted members.  Lastly, federal income tax advantage rounds out the four elements of 
RMC.  Since BAS and BAS are not taxed as income, OSD quantifies the tax advantage as 
the dollar value that a member would pay in federal income tax if they were taxed.  
(DoD, 2008b:20)   
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History 
 History shows that since the beginning of the all-volunteer force, retention suffers 
when RMC falls with respect to civilian wages.  Military officials attribute this pay gap to 
the recruiting problem that beset the military services in the late 1970’s.  The DoD 
Authorization Act of 1981 included an 11.7 percent pay increase to mitigate the 
recruiting and retention shortfalls when RMC was set to civilian wages for workers with 
comparable education and experience levels (OSD, 2005:34).  Many pay comparisons 
begin in 1982 since Congress instituted large raises to mitigate perceived pay gaps 
between military personnel and workers in the private sector (CBO, 2007:2).     
 The Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) is an investigative 
look at compensation charged to the Secretary of Defense by the President.  In his charge 
to the Secretary for the 10th QRMC, President George W. Bush stated in August 2005:  
To continue to recruit and retain highly qualified personnel for the uniformed 
services as they transform themselves to meet new challenges, the departments 
concerned must offer, in addition to challenging and rewarding duties, 
compensation appropriate to the services rendered to the Nation.  The departments 
also must apply the substantial taxpayer resources devoted to uniformed services 
compensation in the most effective manner possible (DoD, 2008b:ix).   
  
 For more than 30 years, the DoD successfully recruited and retained personnel in 
the correct size and skill-set to support the Department’s strategy objectives.  The DoD 
recruited 180,000 new active duty enlisted members in fiscal year 2007; not one branch 
of service failed to meet its recruiting goals.  This number may suggest that there is not a 
recruiting problem, however there are more details worthy of note.   
 The DoD evaluates the quality of enlisted recruits through the use of two measures 
called educational achievement and training aptitude.  Educational achievement is the 
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percentage of recruits who successfully complete high school.  The DoD uses the Armed 
Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) as the training aptitude measure. 
 Recruits with high school diplomas and scores at the 50th percentile or higher 
generally complete their first term of enlistment and perform better on the job than those 
with General Educational Development certificates and scores below the 50th percentile.  
The DoD sets the educational achievement standard at 90 percent of recruits completing 
high school.  The training aptitude benchmark is 60 percent scoring at or above the 50th 
percentile, or Category I-IIIA.  
 
Figure 1.  Recruit Quality for the Active Duty Enlisted Force, 1973-2007 
          Source: (DoD, 2008b:4) 
Figure 1 suggests that while raw numbers are being met for the size of recruiting classes 
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in the DoD, the proportion of accessions that the Department targets as high-quality 
recruits has fallen consistently in the past fifteen years aside from an increase following 
the boost in patriotism in the United States following the 9/11 attacks.     
 Figure 2 aggregates the two measures of recruit quality but separates the success of 
recruiting between the branches of service.  The reader should note that the proportion of 
high quality recruits decreased as the number of authorizations in the DoD were drawn 
down throughout the 1990’s.  This left fewer high-quality uniformed personnel to fill the 
senior ranks in subsequent years and may leave a void in the capabilities of tomorrow’s 
force.   
 
Figure 2:  High-Quality Recruits to the Active Duty Enlisted Force, 1973-2007 
          Source: (DoD, 2008b:5)  
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In Figure 2, we observe a downward trend in recent years.  After a brief increase in the 
quantity of high-quality recruits in 2000, we see a downward trend re-emerge in 2004.  
Drops in the proportion of high quality recruits can be attributed to a few external factors: 
more students entering two- and four-year colleges and universities, increase in family 
income to pay for students entering higher learning institutions, a growing economy, and 
less influencers recommending the military. 
 How do these recruiting talking points affect retention?  The decreasing number of 
high-quality recruits leaves a smaller pool of talent to fill senior ranks.  The 9th QRMC 
recommended that military pay be comparable to the 70th percentile of civilian wages of 
similar education and experience.  In previous years, the DoD used high school graduates 
as the appropriate demographic to program salaries of enlisted personnel and college 
graduates for officers.  The 2002 analysis found that education levels of the mid- and 
senior-level enlisted ranks and junior officers have increased significantly in recent years.  
A 2005 study estimated that 72 percent of enlisted members had one or more years of 
college education.  (CBO, 2007:12).  Therefore, the 9th QRMC found RMC to be below 
the 70th percentile of these groups when compared to the targeted civilian populations.  
The 2002 National Defense Authorization Act included a pay increase to retain and draw 
down the pay gap between mid- and senior level non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and 
junior officers with civilian wages.  We observed, as a result, more favorable comparison 
between military and civilian wages.  For example, in 2006 the average enlisted member 
earned approximately $5,400 more than civilian counterparts; the average officer earned 
$6,000 more.  The following figures compare RMC to the 70th percentile for enlisted and 
officer personnel, respectively, in 2006.  The graphic confirms a 2005 analysis that 
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suggested RMC is comparable to the selected benchmark.  (CBO, 2007:2). 
 
Figure 3:  Enlisted Regular Military Compensation versus Civilian Earnings, 2006 
        Source: (DoD, 2008b:25). 
 
Figure 4:  Officer Regular Military Compensation versus Civilian Earnings, 2006 
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          Source: (DoD, 2008b:25). 
 Although interesting for a quick, aggregate review of the average military member, 
the decision criteria of military members is anything but average.  For example, the top 
50 percent of officers work in thirteen of a possible 141 fields.  How do those officers 
compare to wage earners in the civilian population?  Does the civilian population have 50 
percent of its work force working as mobility pilots, fighter pilots, clinical nurses, air 
battle managers, development engineers, students, or employed in communications and 
information, space and missile, intelligence, personnel, and logistics readiness?  While 
the answer to that question is outside of the scope of research for our paper, we introduce 
the idea because we believe that military members are too complex to model at the 
aggregate level.  The military member perceives skill transferability, education benefits, 
the economy, and the value of cash and non-cash compensation differently and should be 
modeled at the individual level.   
Types of Compensation 
 Cash compensation, or RMC, composes 48 percent of total compensation to 
uniformed personnel and is usually the source of basis between comparable wages 
between military members and private industry.  There are four elements that make up 
RMC: basic pay, BAH, BAS, and the tax advantage incurred because BAH and BAS are 
not taxed as income.   
 Basic pay, the largest part of RMC at approximately 58 percent, is paid to all 
uniformed personnel based on rank and years of service except during periods of 
unauthorized absence, excess leave, or confinement after an enlistment has expired.  It is 
annually adjusted to reflect increases in civilian sector wages and inflation.  Civilian 
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sector wages are estimated using the Economic Cost Index (ECI) found in the Labor 
Statistics published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  By law, the annual increase in 
basic pay should be equal to ECI, but Congress approves increases in the National 
Defense Appropriations Act above and beyond ECI when military compensation levels 
are an area of concern. 
 Military members residing in civilian quarters are paid BAH, a tax-exempt housing 
allowance.  The DoD reviews and annually adjusts BAH as the amount needed to rent 
adequate housing at military members’ duty location.  (OSD, 2005:19).   Military 
members can anticipate adequate housing to be the square footage needed based on 
expected family size at particular ranks.  The dollar value of the entitlement varies 
according to rental costs at the member’s duty location and a higher rate is paid to 
personnel with dependents; on average, BAH comprises nearly 18 percent of cash 
compensation.  On average, single members receive 23 percent less BAH than their 
cohorts with dependents. 
 Military members are paid BAS, a tax-free payment, to be partly defray the cost of 
feeding the member; there are no provisions for military dependents.  The annual 
adjustment for BAS is uniquely tied to the change in the price of food, not wages (OSD, 
2005:183).  Again, unlike BAH, the payment does not increase as rank does.  Instead, one 
rate is paid to enlisted members and one rate is paid to officers with the former being 
higher than the latter.   In 2007, enlisted members were paid $279.88 per month; officers 
were paid $192.74.  On average, these disbursements constitute 7.2 percent of enlisted 
RMC and 2.6 percent of officer RMC.   
 Lastly, the federal income tax advantage is based on an individual member’s tax 
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bracket, number of exemptions, student status, retirement contributions, deployment 
status, and a series of other factors that may impact adjust gross income.  The tax 
advantage is estimated to constitute 6.1 percent of RMC on average if BAH and BAS 
were taxed as regular income; however, the number varies greatly based on the member’s 
tax situation.   
Non-cash Benefits 
 Non-cash benefits, some of which that were considered in the MAC estimated by 
the 10th QRMC, compose 21 percent of compensation to the average military member. 
Healthcare and government housing are the two largest portions of non-cash benefits.   
 Healthcare expenses are difficult to quantify since military members do not pay 
insurance premiums.  Instead, the DoD provides healthcare to uniformed personnel and 
their dependents free of charge through military treatment facilities.  When care at 
military treatment facilities is not possible, either in general or for the particular type of 
care needed, a network of healthcare providers is available for those patients.  Another 
large component of non-cash benefits is government quarters. 
 In 2006, 43 percent of uniformed personnel resided in military housing.  A member 
either receives BAH payments or resides in government quarters while assigned at a 
permanent duty location.  Similar to BAH, the value of government quarters varies 
greatly based on rank and number of dependents, and in limited instances, to position or 
duty title.  Many of the members who reside in government quarters are single junior-
ranked enlisted members in dormitory or barracks-styled housing.  Housing managers 
typically assign members with dependents to townhouses, duplexes, and single-family 
homes when residing in government quarters. 
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Deferred Benefits 
 Lastly, the DoD pays 31 percent of compensation to military members through a 
series of deferred payments and benefits available upon retirement after 20 years.  The 
military retirement program is similar to most defined benefit plans in that DoD 
calculates payments based upon on a formula (Savych, 2005:23).  Under the current 
system, the retirement pay is 2.5 percent of the member’s average of his or her “High-3” 
years of basic pay multiplied by number of years of service.  For example, a member 
retiring after 20 years of service would be paid 50 percent (2.5% x 20) of their High-3 
years of basic pay.  DoD estimates that less than 15 percent of enlisted members and 47 
percent of officers will remain in service long enough to retire from the military.  We 
perceive these percentages as significant when considering healthcare costs.  Funding set 
aside in 2006 for future healthcare liabilities totaled $13 billion, or approximately 87 
percent of the cost for active duty healthcare in the same year (DoD, 2008b:23).  The 
DoD programs nearly as much resources for future healthcare liabilities of retirees as it 
does for active duty personnel. 
 Military compensation comes in many forms; however, DoD only uses basic pay in 
calculating the retirement annuity.  The Office of the Actuary found that while a 20-year 
retiree may be entitled to 50 percent of basic pay, the retiree only receives 34 percent of 
RMC.  Likewise, a 30-year retiree will receive 75 percent of basic pay but only 54 
percent of RMC (Actuary, 2007:10). 
 The current retirement system available to eligible uniformed personnel is a defined 
benefit plan.  Employee retirement plans may otherwise be defined contributions plan.  
The Department of Labor identifies a defined contribution plan as “a type of retirement 
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plan in which the amount of the employer’s annual contribution is specified.  Individual 
accounts are set up for participants, and benefits are based on the amounts credited to the 
accounts, plus any investment earnings on the money in the account.”  In 2006, 90 
percent of medium to large private employers provided some form of retirement plan, but 
less than 40 percent offered a defined benefits plan (CBO, 2007:25). 
 For employees that do not plan to retire from the armed forces or desire to 
supplement the military defined benefits plan upon retirement, the Thrift Savings Plan 
(TSP) is available to them.  The TSP offering may be perceived as an acknowledgement 
of the inadequacy of the defined benefits retirement plan as a retention tool for targeted 
military personnel.  The TSP is very similar to the 401(k), the most common defined 
contributions plan offered to civilian workers.  It offers five investment mutual funds: 
Government Securities Investment Fund (G), the Fixed Income Index Investment Fund 
(F), the Common Stock Index Investment Fund (C), the Small Capitalization Stock Index 
Investment Fund (S), and the International Stock Index Investment Fund (I).  We 
introduce the concept TSP because it may serve as an enabler of separation.  Whereas 
previously military members had an all-or-nothing retirement benefit available through 
their employer, members now have a broad market investment tool that fully vests 
investors before twenty years of service. 
 The vesting period differs greatly between the private sector and the armed 
services.   Most vesting rules for private-sector retirement plans are set out in the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.  Employees in the civilian sector are 
required to be fully vested after 7 years by federal law, but the funds are not available for 
withdrawal without penalty until 59 ½ years of age (OSD, 2005:939).  Employees are 
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entitled to their own contributions immediately; vesting rules govern when they are 
entitled to employers’ contributions (CBO, 2007:16).  Additionally, 401(k) withdrawals 
receive no protection against the effects of inflation unless a portion of the investments is 
made in tax-exempt government bonds.  The military retirement annuity is not available 
to personnel until they reach 20 years of service.  While the vesting period may differ by 
13 years, military retirement is valuable since it pays immediately following retirement.  
This can be as early as 38 years of age for enlisted personnel and 42 for officers.  In 
contrast to 401(k) withdrawals, the DoD protects the military retirement annuity against 
inflation by annually adjusting the payment.   
 Warner and Pleeter (2001), in research that reviewed how military members 
preferred lump sum payments to a deferred annuity, estimated that military members’ 
personal discount rate ranged from zero to 30 percent.  The work added that the vast 
majority of military members personal discount rates exceed 18 percent.  Since defined 
contribution plans vest after a few years and nearly immediately become part of the 
employee’s investment portfolio, and because junior military members highly discount 
retirement benefits, civilian retirement programs are more valuable than the military 
retirement annuity in early years of uniformed personnel careers.  The value of military 
pension increases as military members approach 20 years of service because the 
probability of becoming eligible for military retirement increases.  The uncertainties 
regarding whether a member will become retirement eligible, or how long the member 
will live, may affect member personal discount rates.  The figures below provide a 
graphical depiction of the 10th QRMC’s representation of MAC to include the value of 
military retirement throughout a 20-year career of enlisted personnel and officers (DoD, 
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2008b:33).   
 
Figure 5:  Military Annual Compensation for Enlisted Personnel, 2006 
          Source: (DoD, 2008b:33) 
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Figure 6:  Military Annual Compensation for Officers, 2006 
          Source: (DoD, 2008b:33) 
 Burrell (2007) attempted to capture the value of military retirement through present 
value analysis of the pay gap between the military and civilian sectors.  The author used 
cumulative pay gap to represent the future value of an annuity due, but the dollar value 
was not high enough to solve the rate of return equation, suggesting an infinite return.
 The DoD annually adjusts non-disability retirement for inflation with Cost-of-living 
adjustments (COLA) every December 1st to be reflected in basic pay the following 
calendar year.  The increase is calculated by the average percentage increase in the Urban 
Wage Earner and Clerical Worker Consumer Price Index from the third quarter of the 
previous year to the third quarter of the current year (Actuary, 2007:9).  Additionally, 
COLA and retirement pay do not reduce social security benefits.  Since military 
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personnel have paid social security taxes, they are entitled to full benefits in addition to 
their military retirement annuity (Henning, 2006:4). 
Retirement Debate 
 Why does military retirement continue to be a hot topic?  Critics of non-disability 
retirement contest that military retirement (1) retains too many average or below-average 
performers on active duty,  (2) does not encourage enough members to remain beyond 20 
years of service, and (3) fully vests too late at the 20-year mark.  Critics also suggest that 
compensation policies inherited from 1940’s legislation are largely outdated (Williams, 
2005:12).  Rapidly increasing retiree-related benefits may “crowd out” defense resources 
that could otherwise be used for manpower objectives and weapon system procurement 
and sustainment.  “The military retirement system has been cut twice since 1980, and 
since 1993 has been the target of 17 legislative proposals to further reduce the value of 
military retirement compensation” (Fenton 1999:2).  Research suggests that substantial 
savings, as much as $2.4 billion annually, are possible in the conversion to a defined 
contribution retirement (Asch, Johnson, and Warner 1998: 48). Another argument rebuts 
that with an annual $450 billion defense budget, retiree benefits are not significant 
enough to “crowd out” defense capabilities, and that a $12-trillion Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) can adequately fund both military retirement benefits and present national 
security objectives. 
 There are approximately 2.1 million military retirees and survivor benefit 
recipients.  This population and their associations’ efforts to secure more retiree benefits 
is supported by four dynamics:  
(1) the outpouring of nationwide nostalgia and support for the past heroism and 
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current old-age needs of the “greatest generation” of World War II-era veterans; 
(2) concern over problems the military services were having in recruiting and 
retaining sufficient numbers of qualified personnel, which have been exacerbated 
by ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and to the extent to which 
actual or perceived inadequacies in retirement benefits may have been 
contributing to these problems; (3) the impression by many current of former 
military personnel that the Clinton Administration was not favorably disposed 
toward the military as an institution, leading to efforts to portray increased 
retirement benefits as a palliative, and (4) in a reversal of the attitudes toward the 
Clinton Administration, efforts to obtain more benefits from the Bush 
Administration because it is perceived as being pro-military.  And since 
September 11, 2001, there has been a predictably dramatic increase in public and 
congressional support for the Armed Forces (Henning, 2006:1). 
  
 The cost of the military retirement pension is budgeted through accrual accounting.  
The DoD budget for each fiscal year includes an estimation of dollars plus interest 
accrued in U.S. government securities needed to fund future military retirement annuities.  
The budget outlays are transferred to the Military Retirement Fund (MRF), located in the 
Income Security Function of the federal budget.  Approximately 35 to 40 percent of 
military basic pay costs are programmed in the annual DoD personnel budget for transfer 
to the MRF.  The interest it earns funds retiree pay for current active duty personnel in 
the current fiscal year that will become eligible for retirement (Henning, 2006:2). 
 Since there is a slow increase in the number of retirees and survivor benefits 
recipients, coupled with inflation, the cost of military retirement rises each year.  The 
table below indicates the costs of payments to current retirees (federal budget outlays) 
and funds set aside for future retirees (accrual outlays) (Henning, 2006:8). 
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Table 1:  Military Retirement Outlays (billions of current dollars) 
 
          Source: (Henning, 2006:8) 
 The defense budget requirements for military retirement are costly, and under 
current trends, will continue to climb.  As explained earlier, the primary purpose of 
military compensation is to support defense manpower objectives and ultimately the 
national security strategy of the United States.  Burrell (2007) found through panel 
regression that the retirement system, a major component of compensation to uniformed 
personnel, does influence a member’s decision to remain in the military or seek 
alternative employment.  In that study, enlisted members and officers were modeled 
separately to estimate the relationships with retention to military retirement, 
unemployment in the private sector, the existence of military contingencies, and 
additional pay above and beyond ECI.  Burrell stated the greatest potential in the thesis 
lies in capturing the rate of return of our current retirement system. 
 Burrell’s enlisted model explained the majority of variation (R-squared 0.992) in 
continuation rates, the variable used to describe retention.  Only two variables were found 
to be statistically significant, the rate of return of the MRF and whether or not a 
contingency operation was in effect.  He found that as the rate of the retirement plan 
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increased an individual would have a greater propensity to remain in the military.  The 
model predicted that when a military contingency was in effect, an enlisted member was 
more likely to remain on active duty.  While the variable was statistically significant, 
very little magnitude was associated with military contingency effects.  The author 
argued that high operations tempo may weigh heavily on enlisted member’s minds on 
remaining in the military, but it is not heavily acted upon. 
 Burrell did not explain with success the variation in continuation rates among 
officers that he modeled with enlisted members (R-squared 0.4769).   The rate of return 
of the MRF was found to be significant and to have the greatest magnitude of any 
variable.  However, the coefficient was unexpectedly found to be negative suggesting that 
an increase in return raises the desire of officers to separate.  Burrell provided two 
possible explanations for this: (1) the rate of return was lower than expected and (2) MRF 
is not a reliable proxy for military retirement’s effect on officer retention.  The other 
statistically significant variable in Burrell’s officer model was the unemployment rate.  
Again, the model provided unexpected results because the coefficient on unemployment 
is negative.  This suggests that when unemployment increases, a suggestion that the 
economy is suffering, retention among officers deceases.  Burrell explained this through 
the effect of a patriotic calling. 
 Moon (2004) in an analysis of surveys administered to separating members, found 
patriotism to rank 36 of 38 variables associated with separating from active duty service.  
This contests Burrell’s claim that military members would enter private industry to 
“save” the economy in a calling to patriotism.  Conducted in 2000, the surveys ranked 
retirement programs #12, availability of dependent medical care #13, pay and allowances 
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#17, and availability of medical care #21 among 38 influences to leave active duty 
service.  The top three reasons for leaving the services were availability of comparable 
civilian jobs, choice of job assignment, and say in base of assignment. 
 Scheuchner (1996) found that when looking at influencing factors in the separation 
decision of officers, that availability of civilian jobs, say in the assignment process, 
geographic stability, family separation, and pay and allowances were all statistically 
significant.  However, the magnitude of pay and allowances were lower than all of the 
other variables. 
 In Burrell’s models, the author used a dummy variable to indicate whether a 
contingency variable was in effect or not.  This approach may fail to quantify the 
relationship of retention with the intensity of a given military contingency.  Bernal (2006) 
wrote that studies indicate troops who served in Iraq are suffering from Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD) and other problems on a scale not seen since the Vietnam War.  
According to Walter Reed Medical Center Army Institute of Research, 19 to 21 percent 
of troops who returned from combat deployments meet criteria for PTSD, depression, or 
anxiety.  Almost 82 percent of medical evacuations during Operation Iraqi Freedom were 
due to psychiatric reasons as compared to 15 percent estimated during the Vietnam War.  
The war in Iraq is the nation’s bloodiest war since the military ended conscription in 
favor of an all-volunteer force (Williams, 2005:15).  Hosek et al. (2006: xvi) found 
increased operations tempo to be a significant factor on continued service for enlisted 
personnel.  The heavier burden placed on military personnel in contingency operations 
may weigh heavily on the decision to stay-or-go because of increased operations, the 
intensity of conflict, and chronic separation from family.   
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 Hoge (2006) found through research that combat duty in Iraq was associated with 
high utilization of mental health services and attrition from military service after 
deployments.  PTSD was associated with a 60 percent increase of medical utilization by 
patients for physical problems including respiratory, cardiovascular, neurological, and 
musculoskeletal disorders. 
 The next chapter will lay the roadmap for modeling retention of Air Force officers 
and enlisted members using the value of military retirement, economic factors external to 
military service, and the intensity of military contingencies. 
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III. Methodology 
 
Research Question 
How does the marginal effect of cash and non-cash military compensation 
influence the decision of US Air Force personnel to continue active duty service to 
retirement eligibility? 
Overview 
We engaged our research question with a review of previous literature, data 
collection, and regression analysis to estimate the relationship between military 
compensation and the retention of uniformed personnel in the US Air Force.  We 
collected data to develop a binomial response variable to quantitatively describe the 
continuation decision of military members.  In our research, we reviewed a series of 
inputs that we believe have a relationship with the decision military members make 
regarding retention and collected data to represent these variables.  Additionally, we 
controlled for differences in groups through the use of dummy variables for gender, rank, 
Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC), commissioning source for officers, and citizenship 
status for enlisted members. 
We modeled our data at three points available in our sampling frame: the stay-or-
go decision from 2001 to 2002, 2004 to 2005, and 2007 to 2008.  We estimated officers 
and enlisted personnel separately through a probit model for binary response.  Each 
model estimated the significant contributing factors in an individual’s decision to remain 
in the service from year n to year n + 1.   
Variables 
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Continuation 
 The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) provided individual level data on 
Air Force personnel from the years 2001 to 2008.  Technicians at DMDC developed the 
sampling frame by randomly sampling a cohort from 20 percent of the active duty 
personnel in 2001.  The sampling frame included observations for personnel until 2008 
unless a member separated or retired.  We used the 2008 observations only for 
developing the “Continuation” variable for 2007. 
 We defined the “Continuation” variable as our dependent variable.  It is binary in 
nature with a value of one when a member remains in the active duty Air Force from year 
n to year n +1, or zero when the same member separates or retires before year n + 1.  We 
developed this variable by observing when a member existed in the cohort in the 
subsequent year and coding the observation accordingly. 
Unemployment Rates 
 Previous research revealed two interesting characteristics about unemployment 
rates.  Firstly, retention rates tend to be lower when unemployment rates are lower (Asch 
et. Al., 2002).  Secondly, during the time period observed in this study, availability of 
comparable civilian jobs consistently ranked within the top three of thirty-eight 
influencing factors for separation from active duty service (Moon, 2004).   Additionally, 
after reviewing the Conference Board Index of Leading Indicators, we expect 
unemployment rates to be countercyclical, leading indicators of economic health.  The 
relationship infers that when unemployment falls, expansionary business cycles tend to 
follow.  Therefore, we used the unemployment rate to control for variance in the 
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dependent variable by measuring both availability of comparable jobs and the health of 
the US economy. 
 The Department of Defense measures comparability of military compensation to 
civilian wages based on experience and education (DoD, 2008: 17).  We explored the 
same logic when we developed a proxy for availability of comparable jobs in the private 
sector.  A military member would pursue similar or higher earnings in private sector 
employment according to experience and education required.  Therefore, a military 
member would measure civilian job availability by an unemployment rate according to 
education levels.  We retrieved the employment status of the civilian noninstitutional 
population by gender and highest level of education attained from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics of the United States Department of Labor. 
Value of Cash Compensation 
 OSD pays cash compensation through four components collectively defined as 
Regular Military Compensation: basic pay, BAH, BAS, and the tax advantage incurred 
because BAH and BAS are not taxed as income.  We principally concerned ourselves 
with basic pay for three reasons: (1) BAS only varied whether the member was enlisted 
or an officer; (2) BAH differed according to rank, dependency status, and duty location 
and our data set containing no information on the latter; and (3) the tax advantage cannot 
be easily estimated without information on total household income, home ownership, 
student status of dependents, and retirement contributions. 
 We are modeling officers and enlisted members separately, so including BAS 
would only increase intercept value in each respective model. 
 We believe the value of having information on duty location would greatly benefit 
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this research.  Not only does duty location affect the pay entitlement; duty location may 
affect exposure to the civilian labor market.  For example, a military member may have a 
higher probability of separating if they perceived a more robust labor market at their duty 
station if they were located at Bolling AFB (Washington, DC) as compared to Holloman 
AFB (Alamogordo, New Mexico).  Since we do not have duty location, we eliminated 
BAH altogether from the value of compensation. 
We defined the value of cash compensation in two parts, the benefit and cost.  We 
first estimated the benefit as the discounted sum of cash flows of military compensation 
for the average military career, deferred retirement annuity for the average rank at 
retirement eligibility, and potential civilian earnings following retirement.  We defined 
the average military career by constructing a theoretical enlisted and officer career from 
the average time-in-grade at the time of promotion for military members.  Additionally, 
we retrieved average time-in-grade information from the Information Delivery System of 
the Office of Secretary of Defense.  Furthermore, we estimated the annuity to be paid 
from the earliest retirement eligibility at the age of 42 until the expected year of death at 
84 years old for officers, or from 40 to 80 years of age for enlisted members (OA, 2007: 
27).  We also assumed that individuals, whether they retired or separated from the 
military, would work until 62 years of age.  To proxy for potential civilian wages, we 
retrieved the mean earnings of workers 18 years old and over by education attainment at 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  The second portion of the value of cash compensation 
represented the cost of preferring military compensation.  We assigned a negative value 
to the sum of discounted cash flows of potential civilian wages.  We considered this value 
to be negative because when a military made the decision to remain in active duty 
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service, he or she did so at the cost of potential civilian wages earned today.  We defined 
the value of cash compensation, therefore, as the sum of the compensation benefit and 
cost of continuing in active duty service in the Air Force. 
We expected that the marginal effect of the value of cash compensation would 
increase the probability as the variable increased in value.  
Intensity of Contingencies 
 Military contingencies geographically separate military members from their 
families, expose our services to increased operations tempo, and pose an increased risk 
for injury and death to our service members.  Burrell (2007) developed this construct as a 
dummy variable for years in which the armed services were engaged in combat.  Using 
this method assumed that all military contingencies have an equal effect on retention.  A 
study indicated troops who served in Iraq are suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD) and other problems on a scale not seen since the Vietnam War (Bernal, 
2006:1).  According to Walter Reed Medical Center Army Institute of Research, 19 to 21 
percent of troops who returned from combat deployments meet criteria for PTSD, 
depression, or anxiety.  In our research, we will explore the number of annual military 
casualties as a proxy for the intensity of military contingencies from year to year.  The 
Office of the Secretary of Defense publishes annual casualty numbers at its website.  
Healthcare Benefit 
 When military members and their dependents receive healthcare, they do so 
without incurring any personal financial cost.  We considered this benefit difficult to 
quantify because the member makes no election of how much coverage he or she will 
receive.  The member does not determine the dollars of coverage, the types of diseases or 
 37 
 
injuries to be covered, or whether the coverage adjusts over time.  Additionally, the 
medical benefit becomes more valuable as the member incurs more dependents.  We 
defined the value of the medical benefit as the out-of-pocket expenses that the member 
avoided because they did not pay premiums or co-pays for private medical insurance.  
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services provided total out-of-pocket expense 
data for policies of private industry workers.  The data did not describe the cost of 
workers’ coverage but the cost of the policy to the workers.  We multiplied the out-of-
pocket expenses avoided by the people in the military household to estimate the dollar 
value of military healthcare coverage.  Lastly, we divided by the civilian wages a member 
would have earned had he or she separated to arrive at the percentage of income expected 
to fund healthcare costs in civilian employment. 
For example, a single first lieutenant with a bachelor’s degree in 2005 would 
value healthcare coverage in the Air Force as: $1,228 (Average out-of-pocket expenses) * 
1 (number of people requiring coverage) / $54,689 (mean wages for bachelor’s degree) or 
2 percent.  Likewise, an enlisted member with a family of four and some college 
completed would value healthcare coverage as: $1,228 * 4 / $33,496 or 15 percent.  We 
used this method to estimate the percentage of expected civilian earnings that a member 
would pay in out-of-pocket expenses for healthcare coverage if they were to separate 
from active duty service in the Air Force.   This estimate, although very simplistic, is 
comparable to previous estimates.  Hosek et al. (2005:34) suggested that single military 
members should expect to pay about $1,000 per year in civilian coverage and over $3,000 
(2005:35) for young families. 
Gender 
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 Gender plays a role in the decision to participate in the labor force.  Galor and 
Weil found that “higher wages for women raise the cost of children relatively more than 
they raise household income, and lead to a reduction in the number of children that 
couples choose to have” (Galor and Weil, 1996: 375).  For this reason, we expected that 
when women decide to leave active duty service, it would more likely happen early in 
their career before higher wages increased the opportunity cost of child bearing.  
Controlling for gender separated the marginal effect that military compensation or other 
factors may have on the probability of retaining men or women in active duty service 
from year n to year n + 1.  We defined males as the base group. 
Rank 
 Our use of rank introduced the concept that we expect military members to base 
their decision on what rank they hold.  The military force structure promotes officers and 
enlisted members to encourage performance and to increase desire for more 
responsibility (OSD, 2005:9).  “A promotion is not a reward for past service; it is an 
advancement to a higher grade based on future potential as demonstrated by past 
performance” (AFI 36-201, 2007:62).  We expected as members are promoted, it would 
increase the probability of the individuals to remain in active duty service.  We note that 
part of this effect can be explained with active duty service commitments.  With a move-
up-or-get-out policy in respect to promotions, we still find value in controlling for rank 
because reaching promotions give a member the opportunity to continue serving.    
Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) 
 We expected differences in the probability of a member to remain in active duty 
service when controlling for AFSC.  We noted that availability of comparable civilian 
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jobs consistently ranked within the top three of thirty-eight influencing factors for 
separation from active duty service (Moon, 2004).  Some AFSCs such as lawyers, 
program managers, and dental technicians may have a more robust job pool to choose 
from then those members that work as explosive ordinance technicians or boom operators 
on tanker aircraft.  Additionally, some AFSCs may experience a higher OPSTEMPO that 
contributes adversely to retention rates.  We separated our sampling frame in groups 
according to the first digit of the AFSC such that we control for the differences among 
those members in Operations (1), Maintenance/Logistics (2), Support (3), Medical/Dental 
(4), Legal/Chaplain (5), Acquisition/Finance (6), Special Investigations (7), Special Duty 
(8), and other AFSC identifier (9). 
Methodology 
 Researchers often conduct regression analysis using continuous values to describe 
the dependent variable.  Observing the dependent variable on this scale allows it to take 
on predicted values without restriction.  The predicted value of the dependent variable 
may be expressed as an integer, as a decimal point, and even a negative number when 
regressed on the explanatory variables.  While useful in other conditions, conventional 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) analysis does not reveal the interesting relationship we are 
concerned with in this thesis because its use constitutes a misspecification.  We explain 
the misspecification in the subsection titled “Limited Probability Model.” 
 We modeled the relationship of variables that influence the decision to either 
remain in active duty service (stay) or pursue employment elsewhere (go).  We define 
this decision as the dependent variable “Continue.”  The explained variable does not take 
on continuous values; it is either “Stay” or “Go,” or binary in nature.  Therefore, we 
 40 
 
model our independent variables to observe what factors are statistically significant in the 
individual decision analysis to continue on active duty service in the Air Force from year 
n to year n + 1. 
 Previous research modeled this relationship at the aggregate level.  Burrell (2007) 
used continuation rates to proxy for retention.  Continuation rates represent the 
percentage of Air personnel that continue in active duty service from one year to the next.  
Burrell’s methodology observed how Air Force-level retention changes when factors 
such as military retirement, unemployment rates, and annual pay raises change.  We 
model our data at the individual level.  Researchers may use binary variables to describe 
a qualitative event; such as dummy variables in the explanatory variables to allow for an 
intercept change and/or a slope change amongst various groups.  Instead, we use a binary 
variable to describe a qualitative event: will an individual stay in the Air Force (y = 1) or 
go (y = 0) with a given value of xn? 
Limited Probability Model 
 In the event where our explanatory variables describe a binary outcome, such as 
the decision to “stay or go” in this research, we may use the Limited Probability Model 
(LPM).  In the regression model 
y = β0 + β1x1 + … + βkxk + u, 
we interpret the coefficients on the independent variables slightly different when y takes 
on two discrete outcomes than an in tradition OLS analysis.  The dependent variable can 
either be zero or one in the LPM.  We consider “success” to be when y = 1.  As a result, 
the value by the regression estimates the probability of “success” given the values of the 
array x.  We express this mathematically as  
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P(y = 1│x) = β0 + β1x1 + … + βkxk + u. 
Therefore, we interpret the coefficients on βj as the increase in probability of “success” in 
the qualitative event being observed.  Some researchers may view the LPM as useful 
because the mechanics are the same as OLS; the model is linear in the parameters in βj. 
 We highlight an inherent weakness with the LPM; potentially, the model response 
may include predicted values where y > 1 or y < 0.  Despite the fact that individuals may 
claim to put forth 110% effort, a probability can only exist such that 0 < y < 1.  
Additionally, the LPM restricts our estimations to linear interpretations.  In this research, 
we will estimate the relationship that number of dependents may have on a military 
member’s decision to stay or go.  In a household with a military member, going from 
zero to one child may have more marginal influence on the probability of remaining in 
the service than going from three to four children.  The LPM fails to account for this 
potential difference. 
Probit Model for Binary Response 
 We discussed the inherent weaknesses found in the Linear Probability Model.  
Woolridge (2004: 583) states “the two most important disadvantages are that the fitted 
probabilities can be less than zero or greater than one and the partial effect of any 
explanatory variable is constant.”  The simplicity and weaknesses of LPM can be 
overcome through the use of the Probit, Logit, or Tobit Model for Binary Response.  We 
used probit because the model assumes the error term is normally distributed and probit 
modeling is most commonly used in econometrics. 
 To address the first of the limitations we find in the LPM, we define our model 
such that 
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where we had a continuous, always-increasing function that will return a response 
probability that was equal to zero or one.  As defined above, we estimated the effects of xi 
on the response probability P(y = 1│x), or that a military member remained in the Air 
Force from year n to year n + 1 with the probit binary response model.  We defined the 
opposite case, when a member separated or retired, as 
 
We modeled the relationship that the independent variables had with the increase in 
probability of our response variable with the Eviews 6® statistical package software.  We 
estimated the parameters on xi, as a result of the specifications above, with the maximum 
likelihood function expressed as:   
 
 
 The latent variable model differed from OLS analysis here.  In OLS, the 
coefficient on βk estimated the ceteris paribus effect of xk on the dependent variable, y.   
In a binary response model, the sign of the coefficient on the array on independent 
variables estimated the respective variable’s influence on the probability of “success.”  In 
the latent variable model, we select a threshold such that when yi* exceeds it, 
 
 
 We interpreted this expression as when the latent variable exceeded a certain value, 
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here given as value of zero, the model returned a value of one or a predicted “success.” 
We are using the probit model for binary response such that 
 
 
 
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. 
(Eviews, 2007: 211).  
 Modeling our data in a probit model for binary response estimated the marginal 
effect that cash and noncash elements of military compensation had on the probability of 
successfully retain our Air Force men and women.  We discuss our data and model 
analysis in the next section, Chapter 4. 
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IV. Data and Analysis 
 
 Our data contained a random sample of officers and enlisted members from the 
US Air Force in 2001.  That cohort constituted 20 percent of the 2001 population and our 
data tracked the cohort until 2008.  We modeled our data at three points available in our 
sampling frame: the stay-or-go decision from 2001 to 2002, 2004 to 2005, and 2007 to 
2008.  We emphasize that the data did not introduce new observations to the sampling 
frame in subsequent years.  To the contrary, our data for year n contained only survivors 
from year n - 1.  Therefore, we observed the cohort’s years of service for each 
observation grow by one each year. 
 We placed a few restrictions on the data to constrain our analysis to observations 
that realistically faced a stay-or-go decision.  Burrell (2007) made similar constraints that 
we adopted; Burrell eliminated individuals with the ranks of E1 through E4 and O1 
through O2 in his analysis because the continuation rates were nearly 100 percent.  We 
associated those high retention rates with active duty service commitments inherent when 
a member begins military service: four to six years for enlisted members and four to five 
years for officers.  For this, we eliminated all observations with less than four years of 
service because enlisted members and officers, without a waiver to an active duty service 
commitment, cannot voluntarily separate from the Air Force.   
 Lastly, we eliminated all observations with greater than 18 years of service.  We 
wanted to measure the influence of cash compensation on the decision to remain in active 
duty service up until retirement eligibility.  Individuals nearing retirement eligibility may 
retire at varying points within a calendar year, and therefore we found much variance for 
military members with 19 years of service.  The retention rates for 18 and 19 years both 
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exceed 99 percent; however, the retention rate following 20 years of service falls 
tremendously to 68 and 73 percent for officers and enlisted members, respectively.  
Restricting the upper bound for years of service at 18 eliminated the possibility of 
measuring observations that retire early on in their eligibility. 
In order to ease interpretation of the model, we introduce a few terms.  For a 
military member that continued service in a given year or separated, we defined the 
individuals as survivors or nonsurvivors, respectively.  We also grouped members by 
years of service such that: Zone 1 = 4 – 7 years of service, Zone 2 = 8 – 11 years of 
service, Zone 3 = 12 – 15 years of service, and Zone 4 = 16 – 18 years of service. 
 In our discussion of results, we do not include the coefficients on x from our 
regression equation because the interpretation of the value differs greatly from traditional 
OLS.  The coefficient in a probit model does not estimate the partial effect that an 
independent variable has on the probability of success.  This characterizes one of the 
strengths of the probit model; the binary response model allows nonlinear effects of x on 
P(continue = 1).  Instead, the coefficient is used to estimate the marginal effect when the 
independent variable changes from one specific value to another.  For example, we could 
use the coefficients to estimate the probability of a military member continuing in service 
when the unemployment rate falls from 5.1 to 4.3 percent in 2004, or the increase in job 
opportunity that a male high school graduate observed when he acquired an associate 
degree.  Since the coefficients are not linear in their parameters, we would expect the 
marginal effect to be smaller for that change as compared to a change in the 
unemployment rate from 5.1 to 2.7 percent, or when a male high school graduate 
acquired a baccalaureate degree in 2004. 
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In regards to policy analysis, we are more concerned with the direction of the 
marginal effect of statistically significant variables.  As a result, we report the sign 
associated with significant inputs but do not discuss the magnitude of the effect.  This 
method  
Officer Personnel 
Officer Results for 2001 
 We observed two significant variables in this model, the value of cash 
compensation and the unemployment rate.  We found the value of cash compensation to 
be significant for officers in Zone 1 and the unemployment rate for officers in Zones 1, 2, 
and 3. 
Table 2. Statistically Significant Variables for Officer Stay-or-Go Decision (2001) 
Variable Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4 
Cash Compensation +x*       
Medical Benefits         
Unemployment Rate -x* -x* -x*   
R-Squared: 0.06 "x": significant at .05; "*": significant at .01 level 
 
The value of cash compensation’s influence on the stay-or-go decision displayed 
the expected direction of influence, positive.  The relationship implied that as the value of 
cash compensation inherent in military service increased above the value of earning 
civilian wages today, the probability of remaining in active duty service one additional 
year increased.  We used annual retention rates to construct the table below to estimate 
the number of officers for every 100 that are lost during the specified range of years.  
Zone 1, which included officers with four to seven years of service, contained the largest 
attrition in manpower among officers.  In efforts to retain the optimal mix of forces for 
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mission sustainment, the DoD should hope that compensation packages for Zone 1 favor 
retention of high quality officers since attrition is at its highest. 
Table 3. 2001 Retention (Remaining For Every 100 Officers) 
Range YOS Lost Officers Remaining % Lost 
Zone 0 0 – 3 6 94 6.00% 
Zone 1 4 – 7 33 61 35.11% 
Zone 2 8 – 11 21 40 34.43% 
Zone 3 12 – 15 9 31 22.50% 
Zone 4 16 – 19 1 30 3.23% 
 Source: OSD Information Delivery System 
Our findings provided that officers with four to seven years of service would rather defer 
earning civilian wages until after retirement eligibility.  We did not observe statistically 
significant relationships between retention and the values of cash compensation for Zones 
2 through 4. 
 Additionally, we found a statistically significant relationship between 
unemployment rates and the retention of officers in Zones 1 through 3; however, at first 
glance, the direction of the influence may seem counterintuitive.  The model’s results 
suggest the marginal effects of unemployment decreases the probability of those military 
officers becoming survivors; however we expect that military officers would prefer 
“safe” government employment when job opportunities lag in the private sector.  When 
the economy is weak and unemployment rates increase, there are fewer jobs for those 
entering the civilian labor market.  An investigation in the data reveals some items 
worthy of note. 
 We used unemployment rates based on two factors: gender and highest level of 
education attained.  The unemployment rates in our data set vary among the following 
education levels: non-high school graduate, high school diploma, some college and/or 
associate degree, and baccalaureate degree and above.  In the officer model for 2001, we 
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observe smaller than 1 percent of the sample to have less than a four-year degree in each 
of Zones 1, 2, and 3.  The percentage for females with at least a baccalaureate degree in 
each respective zone is 21.3, 16.4, and 16.1 percent.  Therefore, the marginal effect of the 
unemployment rate on officer retention controls more for job opportunity according to 
gender than levels of education.  We expected that women separating from military 
service would do so earlier in a career rather than later since the opportunity cost 
associated with bearing children becomes prohibitively more expensive as wages 
increase.  We strengthen that claim when we note that 36 percent of females with at least 
four-year degrees have between four to seven years of service as compared to 27 percent 
of males with the same level of education.   While the proportions stay relatively stable 
for males in subsequent groups, we observed a progressive drop for females.  This 
suggests that males and females perceived the stay-or-go decision differently as their 
careers progressed.  Therefore, the negative marginal effect of unemployment rates 
measures the greater attrition for females with baccalaureate degrees and above when 
compared to males. 
Officer Results for 2004 
 We observed two significant variables in this model, the value of cash 
compensation and the unemployment rate for officers with 4 to 7 years of active duty 
service and the value of the medical benefit for officers with 8 to 11 years of active duty 
service. 
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Table 4. Statistically Significant Variables for Officer Stay-or-Go Decision (2004) 
Variable Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4 
Cash Compensation +x*       
Medical Benefits   -x     
Unemployment 
R t  
        
R-Squared: 0.07 "x": significant at .05; "*": significant at .01 level 
 
 Just as we noted in the 2001 model, the DoD benefits from the positive marginal 
effect of the value of military cash compensation on retention especially during periods 
where DoD suffered from its highest attrition rates.  We see below that Zone 1 produced 
the largest drops in military officers again.  In our 2004 model, we estimated that officers 
with four to seven years of service prefer to wait until after retirement eligibility to earn 
civilian wages because the value of cash compensation’s marginal effect on the 
probability of continuing in the service is positive.  We actually observed a stronger 
relationship on this variable and interaction than in the 2001 model; this estimation is 
confirmed when we see that retention in 2001 was 90.97 percent as compared to 91.5 
percent for the same group in 2004. 
Table 5. 2004 Retention (Remaining For Every 100 Officers) 
Range YOS Lost Officers Remaining % Lost 
Zone 0 0 – 3 6 94 6.00% 
Zone 1 4 – 7 26 68 27.66% 
Zone 2 8 – 11 14 54 20.59% 
Zone 3 12 – 15 5 49 9.26% 
Zone 4 16 – 19 2 47 4.08% 
Source: OSD Information Delivery System 
 The 2004 model rendered unexpected results for the value of medical benefits.  
We anticipated that when expected out-of-pocket expenses increased, the military 
member would prefer to remain in active duty service to avoid out-of-pocket expenses 
inherent in private sector employment.  We observed that the marginal effect of the 
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medical benefit decreased the probability of officers with eight to eleven years of service 
to remain in the Air Force.  A non-parametric analysis of the data revealed some valuable 
explanation of the finding. 
 We divided the observations in Zone 2 into quartiles according to the value of the 
medical benefit variable such that the first quartile represented those officers with the 
highest values.  The quartiles were not included in the regression model; the quartiles are 
examined to analyze what may possibly explain the results from our regression.  Within 
the quartiles, we observed an imbalance in the proportion of females.  We recorded these 
values in the table below along with the corresponding retention rates of each group.  The 
value of the military medical benefit is the average out-of-pocket expenses a similar 
civilian employee paid.  We defined “similar” as a civilian employee with the same 
number of dependents and highest level of education attained.  Therefore, the female 
population of officers in Zone 2 looked like we expected them to: as the number of 
dependents grew, there were fewer females in the sampling frame.   
Table 6. Analysis of Medical Benefit Influence on Officer Retention in Zone 2 (2004) 
Quartiles 
   
Observations % Female Female 
 
Male 
 First 474 7.5 74.3 94.5 
Second 474 11.4 94.6 94.5 
Third 474 18.6 89.2 96.9 
Fourth 474 24.2 94.2 96.4 
 
We found an interesting detail in the retention comparison among genders for the first 
quartile, or when the value of medical benefits is greater: the retention rates differ by 
more than 20 percent.  We believe this may explain the unexpected result of the marginal 
effect of the medical benefit on the probability of remaining in the service.  This follows 
the claim that females separate from active duty service sooner as compared to males. 
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Additionally, we observed in the first two quartiles that every female that separated from 
the Air Force was married.  Perhaps being married, and the possibility of having dual-
income households, afforded these nonsurvivor females the ability to separate because 
medical needs of dependents were taken care of otherwise.  
Officer Results for 2007 
 We observed three significant variables in the 2007 model: the value of cash 
compensation for officers with eight to eleven years of service, the value of the medical 
benefit for officers with eight to eleven years of service, and the unemployment rate for 
officers with four to seven years of service and officers with twelve to fifteen years.  
Table 7. Statistically Significant Variables for Officer Stay-or-Go Decision (2007) 
Variable Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4 
Cash Compensation   -x     
Medical Benefits   +x*     
Unemployment 
 
-x*   +x*   
R-Squared: 0.17 "x": significant at .05; "*": significant at .01 level 
 
 We found the value of cash compensation had a negative marginal effect on the 
probability of retention of officers with eight to eleven years of service.  The Air Force 
employed a voluntary separation payment (VSP) incentive program then.  Since the Air 
Force had an overage of 8,000 officers, it used VSP to incentivize those officers with six 
to exactly twelve years of service to voluntarily separate in rebalancing the forces.  In 
2007, the Air Force experienced an 82.7 percent retention rate for officers in Zone 2 as 
compared to 92 and 94.7 percent for the same zone in 2001 and 2004, respectively.  At 
the time, active duty service commitments were waived for officers normally not eligible 
for separation due to promotions, permanent changes-of-station, and commitments 
associated with the use of education benefits.   
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 VSP provided officers with payments that may have otherwise stayed in the Air 
Force.  For example, we estimated the present value of future cash flows that a major 
with a baccalaureate degree and eleven years of active duty service as follows: 
 Present Value of Military Pay: $557,037 
 Present Value of Military Retirement Annuity Payments: $93,854 
 Present Value of Civilian Wages: - $532,114 
We associated civilian wages with a negative sign because the military member accepts 
military compensation at the opportunity cost of civilian wages that could be earned 
today.  In this example, the value of cash compensation was $118,777, but with a VSP 
payment of $147,913, the opportunity cost of not separating brought the value of cash 
compensation down to - $29,136.  We remind that when the value of cash compensation 
carries a negative sign, the present value of future cash flows associated with civilian 
wages outweigh the compensation benefit inherent with serving in the military until 
retirement eligibility.  Since VSP payments are paid in today’s dollars without the effects 
of discounting, and calculated based on years of service and basic pay, an increase in 
military compensation actually increased the value of the VSP.  As a result, the value of 
cash compensation had a negative marginal effect on the probability of retaining Air 
Force officers with eight to eleven years of active duty service. 
 We observed statistical significance on the value of medical benefit for military 
officers with eight to eleven years of service.  We highlighted the force shaping dynamic 
on this group in 2007.  With VSP payments, enterprising military officers took advantage 
of incentives to separate from the Air Force, relatively safe employment, for riskier 
prospects in the private sector.  Military members may have had a higher propensity to 
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separate from active duty service when the members did not have dependents.  We 
divided the sampling frame into quartiles according to ascending values of perceived 
medical benefit.   
Table 8. Analysis of Medical Benefit Influence on Officer Retention (2007) 
Zone 2 (Officers with 4 - 7 YOS) Average # of Dependents 
Range Observations Retention % Non-survivors Survivors 
Quartile 1 450 79.11% 0.26 0.38 
Quartile 2 450 81.33% 1.23 1.37 
Quartile 3 451 84.70% 2.45 2.65 
Quartile 4 450 85.56% 3.81 3.85 
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center 
We saw that as the average number of dependents grew from one quartile to the next, the 
aggregate retention rates did as well.  Additionally, within the quartiles, we observed that 
the average number of dependents increased from non-survivors to survivors.  Therefore, 
those military members that remained in the service with four to seven years may have 
done so because VSP did not provide the financial stability required by members with 
families.  Air Force officers with families did not pursue risky employment with the same 
frequency as those members with fewer dependents.  
 In 2001, we had an unexpected result when our model rendered a negative 
marginal effect of the unemployment rate on the probability of remaining on active duty 
service.  We realized a negative effect again for the unemployment rate in 2007 on the 
retention of military officers with four to seven years.  Smaller than one percent of 
officers had less than a four-year degree in Zone 1, but there were 20.3 percent of females 
that had baccalaureate degrees or higher.  Our regression, similar to the officer model for 
2001, may have been influenced more by the difference in retention among males and 
females.  While exploring possible differences in attrition behavior between the two 
genders, we observed that the Air Force realized retention rates of 62.6 and 77.2 percent 
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for females and males, respectively, for officers in 2004.  Therefore, the unemployment 
rate measured the greater propensity of similarly educated females as compared to males 
to leave military service early on in their careers. 
 The unemployment rate had a significant marginal effect on the probability of 
retaining military officers with twelve to fifteen years of service, as well; however, for 
this zone the relationship was a positive one.  Overall, we saw high retention rates for this 
subgroup, 97.26 percent, and expected such because of the approach towards retirement 
eligibility and the stream of cash flows expected following retirement.  Civilian workers 
with less than a four-year degree suffered worse unemployment rates than workers that 
had completed a bachelor degree program.  Therefore, those military officers with less 
than a four-year degree were exposed to more risk (higher unemployment rate) and less 
return (lower mean wages) than those officers that separated with at least a baccalaureate 
degree.  Females with four-year degrees faced a higher unemployment rate than their 
male counterparts.  We noted that females tend to leave the labor market early so we 
expected retention rates of females to improve more quickly than males.  In our sampling 
frame, the retention rates of female officers confirmed this expectation: 97.6 percent for 
females and 97.2 percent for males with at least four-year degrees. 
Enlisted Personnel 
 
Enlisted Results for 2001 
We observed three statistically significant variables in the 2001 model, the value of cash 
compensation for enlisted members with eight to eleven and twelve to fifteen years of 
active duty service; the value of medical benefits for members with four to seven years of 
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service; and the unemployment rate for enlisted personnel with four to seven and eight to 
eleven years of service.  
Table 9. Statistically Significant Variables for Enlisted Stay-or-Go Decision (2001) 
Variable Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4 
Cash Compensation   +x* +x*   
Medical Benefits +x*       
Unemployment 
 
-x -x     
R-Squared: 0.06 "x": significant at .05; "*": significant at .01 level 
 
The table below displays the retention rates according to zone, a range of four 
years, leading up to retirement eligibility.  We observed far more aggressive attrition 
rates for enlisted members as compared to officers in the earlier stages of their respective 
military careers.  Only 80 percent of enlisted members remained in the service after the 
third year; 94 percent of officers were still in uniform after the same length of time.  This 
may be a result of greater opportunities that exist for officers later in their military careers 
than enlisted personnel and the force structure design for enlisted personnel. 
Table 10. 2001 Retention (Remaining For Every 100 Enlisted) 
Range YOS Lost Enlisted Remaining % Lost 
Zone 0 0 – 3 20 80 20.00% 
Zone 1 4 – 7 43 37 53.75% 
Zone 2 8 – 11 13 24 35.14% 
Zone 3 12 – 15 4 20 16.67% 
Zone 4 16 – 19 0 20 0.00% 
Source: OSD Information Delivery System 
 The optimal mix of forces by rank and skill is outside of the scope of this 
research, but we do find it reasonable to believe that the Air Force desired a high number 
of enlisted recruits for at least two reasons: (1) to fill entry-level positions that did not 
require much experience for proficiency and (2) to have enough enlisted members to fill 
non-commissioned officer positions following a series of promotions later in their 
respective careers.  The purpose of military compensation is to maintain the optimal mix 
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of forces to carry out mission requirements according to national security objectives.  We 
expect the DoD would define compensation values to retain better-qualified enlisted 
members to continue in service and, as a result, less qualified enlisted members would 
self-identify for separation if they did not feel that they could compete for advanced 
promotions. 
 These statements support the findings from our model of 2001 enlisted personnel.  
We found the value of cash compensation had a positive marginal effect on the 
probability of enlisted personnel with eight to eleven and twelve to fifteen years of 
service.  The DoD has long-term incentives such as deferred retirement and medical 
benefits to provide motivation to high quality recruits to remain in service that will be 
competitive for advanced promotion and job placement later in their career.  For every 
100 military members that enlisted in a given year, according to 2001 retention rates, 37 
would remain at the end of the 7th active duty service year; over the course of the next 13 
years, the Air Force expected that better than 50 percent of those still in uniform would 
be retained until retirement eligibility.  We conclude that the positive marginal effect on 
the probability of retention on the personnel with seven to fifteen years of service 
measured the retention of personnel that intended to become career military men and 
women, and as a result, fill senior enlisted non-commissioned officer ranks. 
 We observed a positive marginal effect of medical benefits on the probability of 
retaining enlisted personnel with four to seven years of service.  We did not find 
significance on the value of cash compensation for the same group, so enlisted members 
in this category, when preferring military service to civilian employment, did so because 
of this element of non-cash compensation.  Members desired non-cash benefits above the 
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defined compensation received as either pay or deferred annuity payments when the 
number of dependents increased.  For example, SSgt X amd SSgt Y had the same number 
years of service and education level, so both could expect similar civilian wages should 
they separate.  If SSgt X was single with zero dependents and SSgt Y maintained a 
family of four, SSgt Y needed to earn higher civilian dollars—after paying for medical 
insurance premiums and co-pays for his dependents—to maintain the same purchasing 
power as SSgt X. 
 We found the unemployment rate’s marginal effect on the probability of retaining 
enlisted members with four to seven and eight to eleven years of service to be negative.  
The relationship infers that when the unemployment rate climbed, retention went down.  
We observed something similar for 2001 in the officer model, but were able to attribute 
much of this effect to gender rather than education levels.  In Zone 1, enlisted service 
members were either in their first or second enlistment term and the overall retention rate 
was 98.2 percent.   We attribute the 100 percent retention rate among those members with 
at four-year degree to active duty service commitments associated with taking advantage 
of tuition assistance or other education benefits.  Additionally, the enlisted members that 
pursued four-year degrees may have shared similar characteristics with the enlisted 
members that served in the military until or beyond retirement eligibility.  The second 
claim helped explain why we also observed a negative relationship with the 
unemployment variable and enlisted members with eight to eleven years.  Enlisted 
personnel increased the probability of serving to retirement eligibility when they emerged 
from their eleventh year of service.  Therefore, we anticipate greater retention among 
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those members with four-year degrees, especially if they were accepted and completed a 
commissioning program to serve as an active duty military officer. 
Enlisted Results for 2004 
We observed two statistically significant variables in the 2004 model, the value of 
cash compensation for enlisted members with four to seven, eight to eleven, and sixteen 
to eighteen active duty service years; and the value of medical benefit for members with 
four to seven years of service. 
Table 11. Statistically Significant Variables for Enlisted Stay-or-Go Decision (2004) 
Variable Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4 
Cash Compensation +x +x*   +x* 
Medical Benefits +x*     -x* 
Unemployment 
 
        
R-Squared: 0.08 "x": significant at .05; "*": significant at .01 level 
 
 Our model returned a positive marginal effect of the value of cash compensation 
on the probability of retention for enlisted personnel with four to seven years.  We 
suggest that a response to the recession following the 9/11 tragedy may have contributed 
to enlisted members making their continuation decision did so because members 
perceived the present value of cash flows inherent in military service greater than earning 
civilian wages today.  This may explain why we observed an improvement in attrition in 
Zone 1 from 53.8 percent in 2001 to 39.5 percent in 2004.  Following the recession, 
junior enlisted Airmen preferred “safe” government employment to riskier prospects 
despite the fact that they could have earned higher wages over the course of their lives 
even if they didn’t pursue further education. 
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Table 12. 2004 Retention (Remaining For Every 100 Enlisted) 
Range YOS Lost Enlisted Remaining % Lost 
Zone 0 0 – 3 24 76 24.00% 
Zone 1 4 – 7 30 46 39.47% 
Zone 2 8 – 11 12 34 26.09% 
Zone 3 12 – 15 3 31 8.82% 
Zone 4 16 – 19 1 30 3.23% 
Source: OSD Information Delivery System 
We suggested after seeing the slowdown in attrition following Zone 2 that 
enlisted personnel tend to become career military service members following their 
eleventh year in the Air Force.  We saw that for every 100 enlisted members beginning 
service in the same year, according to 2004 retention rates, 34 continued on after eleven 
years; however, only four would separate before retirement eligibility over the course of 
the next nine years.  The marginal effect of the value of cash compensation increased the 
probability of bringing members to the critical eleven-year point that gave the Air Force 
its senior enlisted corps. 
Additionally, deployments in support of the Global War on Terrorism provided 
monetary incentive through entitlements such as Combat Zone Tax Exclusion, Family 
Separation Allowance, and Hazardous Duty Pay.  These incentives may have further 
increased the value of military compensation over civilian earnings.   
The value of cash compensation had a positive marginal effect on the retention of 
enlisted members in Zone 4, or members with sixteen and eighteen years of service and 
approaching retirement eligibility.  We observed that 99.4 percent of those observations 
perceived more value in serving and subsequently retiring from the military over 
separating and earning civilian wages today. We highlight that attrition for enlisted 
members in Zones 3 and 4 were 16.7 percent and smaller than one percent, respectively, 
to support the tendency of enlisted Airmen choosing career military service if they 
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completed eleven years of service.  We expected the high retention rates during Zone 4; 
we see from our analysis that the value of cash compensation, largely because of the 
military retirement annuity, was the dominating factor above non-cash compensation and 
the economy for this high retention rate. 
 We observed a negative marginal effect that described the influence of the value 
of medical benefits on the probability of retaining enlisted personnel with four to seven 
years of service.  To investigate the result, we analyzed how the continuation rates of 
females within Zone 1 compared when dividing the group into quartiles according to 
ascending value of medical benefit.  We noted before that we expect females to separate 
or retire before the opportunity cost of child bearing became increasingly expensive.  We 
saw here that as the value of medical benefit increased, females separated at a faster rate.  
The retention for the quartiles was 94.4, 93.2, 89.0, and 84.2 percent for females.  We 
observed a very different effect for males; the respective retention rates for the quartiles 
were 89.7, 89.2, 96.4, and 94.4 percent.  Therefore, the negative marginal effect of the 
value of medical benefit on the probability of retaining personnel with four to seven years 
may have captured the tendency of females to separate from service for child bearing.  
We noticed that as the number of dependents grew for females, they were more likely to 
separate and perhaps stay at home with the children. 
Enlisted Results for 2007 
 We observed three statistically significant variables in the 2007 model, the value 
of cash compensation for enlisted members of all years of service, the value of medical 
benefit for members with four to seven years of service and eight to eleven years, and the 
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unemployment rate for enlisted personnel with four to seven years of service and eight to 
eleven years. 
Table 13. Statistically Significant Variables for Enlisted Stay-or-Go Decision (2007) 
Variable Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4 
Cash Compensation +x* +x* +x* +x* 
Medical Benefits +x +x*     
Unemployment 
 
-x* -x*     
R-Squared: 0.08 "x": significant at .05; "*": significant at .01 level 
 
 We saw from the table below that enlisted personnel separated at a faster rate in 
early years as compared to officers so the value of cash compensation’s played a larger 
role in retention for enlisted members.  
Table 14. 2007 Retention (Remaining For Every 100 Enlisted) 
Range YOS Lost Enlisted Remaining % Lost 
Zone 0 0 – 3 21 79 21.00% 
Zone 1 4 – 7 44 35 55.70% 
Zone 2 8 – 11 12 23 34.29% 
Zone 3 12 – 15 3 20 13.04% 
Zone 4 16 – 19 1 19 5.00% 
Source: OSD Information Delivery System 
Our model provided that the value of cash compensation inherent in remaining in the Air 
Force to retirement eligibility had a positive marginal effect on the probability of all 
enlisted members continuing in service for one more year.  The DoD should appreciate 
the finding that when the value of remaining in the military—the summation of cash 
flows found in military compensation, deferred retirement annuity payments, and the 
civilian earnings expected following retirement until the age of 62—increased against the 
value of civilians earned today until retirement, the probability of retention of enlisted 
personnel with four to eighteen years of service increased.  The favorable results may 
have been linked to the added benefit of contingency entitlements for those members that 
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deployed in support of the Global War on Terror since the largest benefit, the income tax 
exemption, was proportionally linked to the value of basic pay. 
 Our modeled estimated a positive marginal effect of the value of medical benefits 
on the probability of remaining in the service for enlisted members with four to seven 
years of service and eight to eleven years.  We found a noteworthy item regarding the 
value of medical benefit, or the percentage of expected civilian earnings that would go to 
out-of-pocket medical expenses outside of private medical insurance.  Within the Zone 1 
subgroup, 78.5 enlisted members had only high school diplomas and 21.5 had at least an 
associate degree.  The respective rates for those members were 88.8 percent and 85.2 
percent.  We found of the enlisted members in Zone 2, 69.3 percent had less than an 
associate degree, 25.5 percent had an associate degree, and 5.2 percent had at least a four-
year degree.  The retention rates for those groups were 92.3, 90.4, and 89.2 percent, 
respectively.  We concluded that enlisted members with less than an associate degree and 
not enough valuable experience did not anticipate that they would find high enough 
wages to cover the medical needs of themselves and their dependents and therefore had 
higher retention rates. 
 We observed a negative marginal effect of unemployment rates on the probability 
of retention of enlisted members with four to seven and eight to eleven years of service.  
The tables below contain retention rates for the different groups by their respective 
unemployment rates according to gender and highest level of education attained.  
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Table 15. Analysis of Unemployment Influence on Enlisted Retention in Zone 1 (2007) 
Education Unemployment Observations Retention 
4 Year+ (M) 1.90% 39 94.90% 
4 Year+ (F) 2.10% 20 85.00% 
Some College (M) 3.40% 293 84.00% 
Some College (F) 3.70% 196 84.70% 
High School (F) 4.30% 447 86.10% 
High School (M) 4.40% 1553 89.60% 
  
Table 16. Analysis of Unemployment Influence on Enlisted Retention in Zone 2 (2007) 
Education Unemployment Observations Retention 
4 Year+ (M) 1.90% 255 91.00% 
4 Year+ (F) 2.10% 114 85.10% 
Some College (M) 3.40% 1251 89.10% 
Some College (F) 3.70% 548 88.10% 
High School (F) 4.30% 944 90.30% 
High School (M) 4.40% 3948 91.70% 
No High School (M) 8.20% 1 100.00% 
 
We believe the active duty service commitments that enlisted members incur when using 
educational benefits may influence retention by removing the ability to make a decision.  
This would explain why retention rates are higher for members with four-year degrees 
than those with only some college or associate degrees despite the fact that those with 
four-year degrees would expect higher civilian wages.  The members with less than a 
four-year degree but some college may have stopped attending school altogether or 
temporarily to attend college as a civilian without incurring active service commitments.  
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V. Conclusion 
 
 This chapter will address the findings, the validity of those findings, and policy 
implications.  Lastly, we offer suggestions to expand on this research to improve the 
robustness of the model. 
Summary and Implications 
 
 After reviewing government publications, peer-review journals, independent 
research, theses, and dissertations we saw potential for addition to the body of knowledge 
of military retention.  Previous work focused on Air Force personnel as a whole and, in 
turn, virtually treated all individuals as the average military member.  Service in the 
armed forces is an emotional decision.  Members join for a variety of personal reasons 
and the reasons surrounding their retention are just as personal.  Air Force men and 
women respond to job challenges, assignments, contingencies, separation from family, 
and other decision criteria differently.  Military compensation, whether cash or non-cash, 
serves as an enabler of continuation but is not the sole instrument in retention. 
 So how do military members respond to this enabler of continuation when 
modeled at the individual level?  Our findings suggest that officers with four to seven 
years of service respond positively to compensation inherent in a military career over a 
civilian one.  The Air Force suffers the largest rate of attrition of officers during the four- 
to seven-year marks.  The DoD should hope that during a vulnerable period of retention, 
the remaining members are the best mix of forces to field senior positions.  Enlisted 
personnel respond positively to military compensation as well.  We found that enlisted 
members tend to separate more aggressively as compared to officers; however, as they 
emerge from the seven-year mark, the probability of them continuing to serve to 
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retirement eligibility greatly improves.  For these groups of officers and enlisted 
members, the value of cash compensation has a statistically significant impact on their 
decision to continue.  In order to retain the caliber of military members needed to field 
mid-level and subsequently senior leadership positions, military compensation must be 
adequate enough to retain high-quality members to effectively sustain operations. 
 We also observed two interesting details regarding gender and education levels.  
We found the quit behavior between males and females do not follow the same pattern.  
When a female serves in active duty, she is more likely to be have less than eight years of 
service because females tend to separate sooner in their careers rather than later.  
Additionally, we observed statistically significant differences among enlisted members 
with varying levels of education.  Enlisted personnel with four-year degrees tend to 
remain in the Air Force.  The military member that pursues education to better their 
standing may share similar characteristics with those members that serve in the Air Force 
to retirement eligibility. 
Suggestions For Further Research 
 Our research would have greatly benefited from the use of time series analysis.  
We planned to estimate the probability of a military member’s decision to continue in 
military service over time with a binary response probit model over time with our cohort; 
however, time did not permit such an ambitious endeavor.  Although our research 
revealed interesting points, low R-Squared values for our models suggest that the 
methodology did not suit the variance in our dependent variable with consistent accuracy.  
Our data contained a key variable for each observation and tracked the survivors across 
time from 2001 to 2008.  Time series analysis could estimate how the influence of cash 
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and non-cash compensation on the individual affected the probability of continuation in 
service.  Instead, in the interest of time, we were required to estimate with the much less 
robust method of cross-sectional analysis. 
 Cross-sectional analysis greatly changed our methodology.  Deferring to this 
methodology changed the interpretation of some of our variables, led to the omission of 
variables, and prevented the ability to control for groups that we found interest in 
estimating differences for. 
We had a series of dummy variables such as gender, AFSC, rank, and deployment 
status.  When estimating across a single year, we encountered the problem associated 
with perfect predictions.  For example, we may have experienced variance in the 
dependent variable for female majors that served in the medical support group of AFSCs; 
however, when we included the dummy variable for deployment, we could have observed 
that 100 percent of female medical officers with the rank of major and deployed 
continued in service.  When an event such as this occurs, we cannot control for 
differences among groups even when we have a large sample size because no difference 
may exist. 
Our dataset included information on the deployment status of each military 
member in a particular year.  In time-series analysis, we could have measured the impact 
of multiple deployments on a member’s decision to continue in service.  We anticipated 
the grueling challenges of increased operations tempo and chronic separation from family 
would better explain the variance found in the decision to stay-or-go than whether the 
member was deployed in a given year.   
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When a member deployed for four, six, or twelve months it was very likely he or 
she would continue in service the following year because deployments could potentially 
cross calendar years.  Additionally, military members faced active duty service 
commitments and may not have had the ability to separate in the time between 
redeploying and the end of the calendar year.  Also of note, the Air Force provided 
monetary incentive in the form of additional entitlements to those members that deployed 
in support of contingency operations. 
A single deployment and the extra income associated with it may not have 
dissuaded a member from continuing in service, but subsequent deployments could have 
diminished the value of the monetary incentives.  Without the benefit of a lagged 
dependent variable or the ability to quantify for multiple deployments, the deployment 
status did not explain the variance it would have with the benefit of time series analysis.  
Ultimately, we did not find relevance for this variable in cross-sectional analysis and 
eliminated it from our analysis. 
We noted unexpected results from the unemployment variable for some groups at 
first glance; however, further analysis provided better explanation of what our model had 
estimated.  In cross-sectional analysis, the unemployment variable measured the marginal 
effect of varying civilian employment opportunities—controlling for gender and highest 
level of education attained—on the probability of retention of military personnel.  In time 
series analysis, measuring how the relationship between potential alternative employment 
and retention differed from one year to the next, would increase the explanatory power of 
our model.  Without time series analysis, we could not account for the changes in 
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unemployment and the economy across time and how military members responded to 
those changes. 
Most importantly, as we noted earlier, military members incurred lengthy service 
obligations after permanent changes-of-station, promotions, and taking advantage of 
education benefits.  For example, a military member that preferred not to deploy 
following the Iraqi invasion in 2003, may have had to wait until 2005 to do so.  Our 
cross-sectional analysis could not account for this lagged response.  This may explain 
why we observed the highest R2 value in our officer model for 2007; Air Force officers 
were granted waivers to active duty service commitments that immediately allowed them 
to voluntarily separate.  Largely, military members did not act on immediate response to 
variables that affect the decision to stay or go because active duty service commitments 
may differ from zero days to five years.  Without lagged variables, we cannot optimize at 
what point inputs to the model change the binary response from continue in service to 
separate for civilian earnings. 
Conclusion 
The DoD designs compensation to be adequate and fair to support manpower 
policies without crowding-out operations, readiness, recapitalization and modernization 
of weapon systems.  Additionally, compensation must motivate personnel performance 
while being responsive to private sector wages and effective during times of peace and 
war.  Senior decision makers should use our work to support manpower policies that are 
put in place.  While our research did not explore whether the remaining forces that fill 
Air Force ranks are the best mix of personnel, we can conclude cash compensation served 
as an effective retention instrument for those members that remained.  
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Appendix A: 2001 Officer Model Results 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: CONTINUE
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing)
Date: 04/20/08   Time: 23:09
Sample (adjusted): 1 7176
Included observations: 7176 after adjustments
Convergence achieved after 13 iterations
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 2.538729 0.293852 8.639497 0
VCASH*ZONE1 1.69E-06 4.52E-07 3.731807 0.0002
VCASH*ZONE2 -9.88E-07 5.61E-07 -1.762157 0.078
VCASH*ZONE3 -4.38E-07 8.61E-07 -0.508942 0.6108
VCASH*ZONE4 4.86E-07 2.44E-06 0.199338 0.842
VMB*ZONE1 3.369787 1.884855 1.787823 0.0738
VMB*ZONE2 1.566568 1.77226 0.883938 0.3767
VMB*ZONE3 1.85337 2.242601 0.826438 0.4086
VMB*ZONE4 3.400274 5.11684 0.664526 0.5064
UR*ZONE1 -54.92291 13.66228 -4.020039 0.0001
UR*ZONE2 -62.52325 15.10927 -4.138072 0
UR*ZONE3 -45.77213 15.40019 -2.972179 0.003
UR*ZONE4 -20.38396 30.65498 -0.664948 0.5061
McFadden R-squared 0.055949     Mean dependent var 0.939521
S.D. dependent var 0.238389     S.E. of regression 0.235982
Akaike info criterion 0.434648     Sum squared resid 398.8901
Schwarz criterion 0.447109     Log likelihood -1546.515
Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.438936     Restr. log likelihood -1638.17
LR statistic 183.3084     Avg. log likelihood -0.215512
Prob(LR statistic) 0
Obs with Dep=0 434      Total obs 7176
Obs with Dep=1 6742
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Appendix B: 2004 Officer Model Results 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: CONTINUE
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing)
Date: 04/20/08   Time: 23:04
Sample: 1 7240
Included observations: 7240
Convergence achieved after 13 iterations
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 1.811846 0.444334 4.077666 0
VCASH*ZONE1 1.34E-06 3.87E-07 3.456287 0.0005
VCASH*ZONE2 2.77E-07 5.59E-07 0.496032 0.6199
VCASH*ZONE3 -6.14E-07 9.06E-07 -0.677525 0.4981
VCASH*ZONE4 -3.21E-06 3.03E-06 -1.062194 0.2881
VMB*ZONE1 1.716669 1.587014 1.081697 0.2794
VMB*ZONE2 -3.656509 1.62992 -2.243367 0.0249
VMB*ZONE3 -2.677713 2.207703 -1.212896 0.2252
VMB*ZONE4 1.622781 5.65046 0.287194 0.774
UR*ZONE1 -14.88141 15.9645 -0.932157 0.3513
UR*ZONE2 1.049714 16.79955 0.062485 0.9502
UR*ZONE3 11.5699 17.48456 0.661721 0.5082
UR*ZONE4 56.87203 34.32418 1.656909 0.0975
McFadden R-squared 0.066791     Mean dependent var 0.951519
S.D. dependent var 0.214794     S.E. of regression 0.212494
Akaike info criterion 0.365708     Sum squared resid 326.3256
Schwarz criterion 0.378075     Log likelihood -1310.864
Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.369962     Restr. log likelihood -1404.684
LR statistic 187.6406     Avg. log likelihood -0.181059
Prob(LR statistic) 0
Obs with Dep=0 351      Total obs 7240
Obs with Dep=1 6889
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Appendix C: 2007 Officer Model Results 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: CONTINUE
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing)
Date: 04/20/08   Time: 22:58
Sample: 1 5522
Included observations: 5522
Convergence achieved after 13 iterations
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 1.259863 0.317774 3.964647 0.0001
VCASH*ZONE1 -5.08E-07 5.68E-07 -0.894623 0.371
VCASH*ZONE2 -1.07E-06 4.17E-07 -2.566638 0.0103
VCASH*ZONE3 6.78E-07 8.95E-07 0.757936 0.4485
VCASH*ZONE4 8.91E-07 2.46E-06 0.361728 0.7176
VMB*ZONE1 3.929971 2.145962 1.831333 0.0671
VMB*ZONE2 4.060231 1.211164 3.352338 0.0008
VMB*ZONE3 -2.072072 2.149751 -0.963866 0.3351
VMB*ZONE4 -3.165035 4.108019 -0.770453 0.441
UR*ZONE1 -43.00063 16.2532 -2.645671 0.0082
UR*ZONE2 -28.82819 15.95184 -1.807201 0.0707
UR*ZONE3 37.45274 18.15676 2.062743 0.0391
UR*ZONE4 65.42751 38.41602 1.703131 0.0885
McFadden R-squared 0.173752     Mean dependent var 0.905107
S.D. dependent var 0.293094     S.E. of regression 0.277627
Akaike info criterion 0.523121     Sum squared resid 424.6149
Schwarz criterion 0.538698     Log likelihood -1431.338
Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.528553     Restr. log likelihood -1732.334
LR statistic 601.992     Avg. log likelihood -0.259206
Prob(LR statistic) 0
Obs with Dep=0 524      Total obs 5522
Obs with Dep=1 4998
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Appendix D: 2001 Enlisted Model Results 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: CONTINUE
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing)
Date: 04/05/08   Time: 08:38
Sample: 1 22768
Included observations: 22768
Convergence achieved after 12 iterations
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 1.852682 0.15401 12.02964 0
VCASH*ZONE1 -1.39E-07 9.48E-07 -0.146218 0.8837
VCASH*ZONE2 4.23E-06 7.92E-07 5.337816 0
VCASH*ZONE3 3.21E-06 1.05E-06 3.069622 0.0021
VCASH*ZONE4 2.85E-06 1.49E-06 1.916966 0.0552
VMB*ZONE1 2.368503 0.838682 2.824077 0.0047
VMB*ZONE2 0.887352 0.653741 1.357345 0.1747
VMB*ZONE3 0.844218 0.838969 1.006256 0.3143
VMB*ZONE4 0.639491 1.349963 0.47371 0.6357
UR*ZONE1 -7.797467 3.734851 -2.087759 0.0368
UR*ZONE2 -8.643032 4.100513 -2.107793 0.035
UR*ZONE3 -4.320598 5.463046 -0.790877 0.429
UR*ZONE4 0.321137 8.553824 0.037543 0.9701
McFadden R-squared 0.064877     Mean dependent var 0.972461
S.D. dependent var 0.16365     S.E. of regression 0.162426
Akaike info criterion 0.236941     Sum squared resid 600.3236
Schwarz criterion 0.241528     Log likelihood -2684.341
Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.238433     Restr. log likelihood -2870.574
LR statistic 372.4658     Avg. log likelihood -0.1179
Prob(LR statistic) 0
Obs with Dep=0 627      Total obs 22768
Obs with Dep=1 22141
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Appendix E: 2004 Enlisted Model Results 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: CONTINUE
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing)
Date: 04/05/08   Time: 08:46
Sample: 1 23407
Included observations: 23407
Convergence achieved after 12 iterations
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 1.464282 0.171634 8.531428 0
VCASH*ZONE1 1.59E-06 6.56E-07 2.42066 0.0155
VCASH*ZONE2 2.60E-06 7.52E-07 3.460205 0.0005
VCASH*ZONE3 1.52E-06 1.06E-06 1.437979 0.1504
VCASH*ZONE4 4.81E-06 1.70E-06 2.822247 0.0048
VMB*ZONE1 1.385772 0.440456 3.14622 0.0017
VMB*ZONE2 -0.388268 0.518258 -0.74918 0.4537
VMB*ZONE3 0.901973 0.842658 1.070391 0.2844
VMB*ZONE4 -3.597183 1.2549 -2.86651 0.0042
UR*ZONE1 -3.327205 3.474156 -0.957702 0.3382
UR*ZONE2 2.325641 4.107259 0.566227 0.5712
UR*ZONE3 7.165595 5.681269 1.261266 0.2072
UR*ZONE4 8.240057 10.71595 0.768952 0.4419
McFadden R-squared 0.076855     Mean dependent var 0.955526
S.D. dependent var 0.20615     S.E. of regression 0.203745
Akaike info criterion 0.33697     Sum squared resid 971.1282
Schwarz criterion 0.341447     Log likelihood -3930.733
Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.338424     Restr. log likelihood -4257.981
LR statistic 654.4948     Avg. log likelihood -0.16793
Prob(LR statistic) 0
Obs with Dep=0 1041      Total obs 23407
Obs with Dep=1 22366
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Appendix F: 2007 Enlisted Model Results 
 
 
 
 
  
Dependent Variable: CONTINUE
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing)
Date: 04/20/08   Time: 13:00
Sample: 1 17667
Included observations: 17667
Convergence achieved after 12 iterations
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 1.748679 0.127066 13.76195 0
VCASH*ZONE1 3.89E-06 9.58E-07 4.065983 0
VCASH*ZONE2 3.26E-06 5.35E-07 6.083885 0
VCASH*ZONE3 2.31E-06 8.49E-07 2.723307 0.0065
VCASH*ZONE4 3.09E-06 1.20E-06 2.581175 0.0098
VMB*ZONE1 1.600923 0.631422 2.535423 0.0112
VMB*ZONE2 1.119744 0.400846 2.793454 0.0052
VMB*ZONE3 0.480192 0.691202 0.69472 0.4872
VMB*ZONE4 -0.218497 1.138853 -0.191857 0.8479
UR*ZONE1 -17.33753 3.408329 -5.086812 0
UR*ZONE2 -15.08669 3.517878 -4.288576 0
UR*ZONE3 -4.578489 5.189391 -0.882279 0.3776
UR*ZONE4 -8.224954 9.201136 -0.893906 0.3714
McFadden R-squared 0.075733     Mean dependent var 0.94085
S.D. dependent var 0.235912     S.E. of regression 0.232321
Akaike info criterion 0.416693     Sum squared resid 952.8412
Schwarz criterion 0.422417     Log likelihood -3667.856
Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.418577     Restr. log likelihood -3968.393
LR statistic 601.0752     Avg. log likelihood -0.207611
Prob(LR statistic) 0
Obs with Dep=0 1045      Total obs 17667
Obs with Dep=1 16622
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